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The purpose of this  short paper  is  threefold.  First,  I would like
to  review briefly five familiar but  overriding trends affecting the
agricultural sector, which together emphasize  the  limited  impact  that
the  1985  farm bill by  itself can  have on U.S.  competitiveness  in
agriculture.  Second, given these limitations,  I will analyze the  specific
features of  the  1985  bill most likely  to enhance U.S.  agricultural
competitiveness.  Third, I will discuss some  provisions of  the  bill that
may prove distinctly troublesome  for farm policy, and  offer some  proposed
alterations.
Five Trends  Leading to Crisis
The current crisis in American agriculture results  from a series
of  trends  in world markets  that  are  largely beyond  the reach  of  any
domestic farm bill, no matter how well crafted.  The problems  of  the
Farm Credit System are but  a reflection of  the general crisis  in
agriculture.  Confronting the problems  of American farmers  and farm
credit markets  therefore  requires  an understanding of  the  larger forces
affecting American agriculture in  a world economy.  These forces  condition
all  that we do  in agricultural policy.
Trend #1:  Chronic Overproduction  of Grain Crops
A  recent article  in Foreign Affairs described the global  food
stock situation  (despite continued  famine in some  parts of Africa) as
a  "world awash in grain."  This  is accurate.  This year, world surplus
stocks of grain will total  nearly 200 million metric tons.  The United
States will account  for  approximately 44%  of  this world surplus.-2-
Needless  to say,  this  level of  overproduction creates  tremendous down-
ward pressure on prices, because  buyers for  it  cannot  be  found.
In the United States,  to take one example, despite  record grain
purchases by  the Soviet Union, wheat surplus  stocks  for  1985-86 are
estimated to  be unprecedented - almost enough so  that we would
scarcely need to plant  a crop to maintain current supplies.  CCC  corn
stocks will double, from 240 million bu.  to  about 475.  Government
wheat  ownership will leap  to 450 million bu.  from 378.  Soybean stocks
will rise to  100  million bu.  Rice, barley,  sorghum and  sugar stocks
are all on the  rise too.  Over 5 million bales  of  cotton  could wind
up  in CCC warehouses in 1985,  compared with an expected  1.7  million
bales for  1984.  The government is  not  the only one with  its  bins  full.
Wheat and  feed grains in  the  farmer-owned reserve add additional supplies,
as do free stocks.
Soybeans and corn will have  the  smallest ending stock  percentages,
roughly a third of 1985/86 use.  The exact percentage estimates at
harvest were 31  percent for  soybeans, 38  percent  for  corn, with rice
and wheat carryouts much higher, at  62 percent  and 69  percent
respectively.  Cotton is  the most frightening.  At  the  end of  the
1985/86 marketing year, almost 90 percent of  another year's  use  could
be met without planting a seed.
Trend  #2:  Falling Prices
Given this chronic world surplus supply it  is  unsurprising that
prices have  fallen.  In the U.S.,  September farm prices  achieved an
80 month low, down 15  percent  from a year ago,  and  the  lowest since  1978.
The  ratio of prices  received to prices  paid fell  from 87  a year ago to-3-
75  in September, the lowest on record.  Of  course,  because of  the heavy
reliance of  U.S. producers  on export  markets, export declines  and
falling prices  are  related.  Recent calculations  indicate that
agricultural export markets  this year are  down over 5 percent  from
a year ago.  The value  of wheat exports  (again,  even given record
Soviet purchases) will be  off  about  20%,  the value  of  corn exports
will be off  about 5%,  and the  value of  soybean exports will be  off
about 25%.  Falling prices are  linked  to  falling exports,  and falling
exports are linked to a third trend.
Trend #3:  An Overvalued Dollar
Foreign purchasers of  our  food exports must pay  largely in dollars.
When the dollar increases in  value, our grain increases  in price  to
foreign buyers.  According to Wall Street  analysts,  the  dollar's  strength
has accounted for  from half  to three quarters  of  our  current  trade  deficit.
The inverse relationship  between the  exchange value of  the dollar and
agricultural exports  is controversial.  It  is  undeniable, however, that  the
exchange value of  the dollar rose, especially after  1981,  U.S.  agricultural
exports fell  (Figure 1).  Recent  attempts by  central bankers  to  reduce  the
value of  the dollar have driven it down by about 20  percent  off  of  last
February's high, but  it  is  still almost  50 percent  above the  level  at which
agricultural exports began their fall  in  1981.  So  if  falling prices  are
linked to falling exports, and falling exports are  linked  to a strong dollar,
we must explore the  basic causes of  the strong dollar.
Trend #4:  Rising real interest rates
In  1979, when rural  credit markets were derregulated, nominal
rates rose  from an average  of  about 6% to  current averages  of  12-14%.-4-
For a time in 1980,  they approached 20%.  But  as  inflation has  fallen,
the  real.cost of  borrowed capital has  reached historic highs.  These
rates of  interest,  reflecting the cost of  borrowing, are  received  in
payment  by those who buy  bonds and bills - especially Treasury bills
and bonds sold by  the government.  When the  rate offered on  these
Treasury securities  is  high  in real terms,  foreign purchasers  buy
them.  To  buy  them they need dollars.  Hence, high real rates of
interest have  attracted foreign capital and increased the demand  for
dollar denominated assets at  the  same time  that they  have burdened  farm
borrowers.  In  my view, and I believe Chairman Volker's,  the  real  rate
of interest  is a prime mover driving the demand  for  dollars, and
therefore largely determines the strength of  our currency as  well as
the farm cost of money.  We must now ask, what  drives  real  interest  rates?
Trend #5:  Record Deficit Spending
The  rates paid to borrow money are determined in  the market for
Treasury bond and bills.  Current annual deficits  of more than $200  billion
are  the largest  ever recorded, although  farm program costs  are actually a
relatively small proportion of  total  spending (see Figures 2 and 3).  These
massive  borrowing needs are  like  a hemorrhage  in the  national Treasury,
a flow of  borrowing that  puts upward pressure on interest rates  as  buyers
must  be found for  the offerings  of  Treasury securities.  Indeed, were  it  not
for  foreign purchasers of  these securities, domestic interest  rates would
probably  be substantially higher.  Hence, deficit spending drives up  real
interest  rates;  these rates  attract foreign purchasers,  raising  the  value
of the dollar.  The overvalued dollar  chokes  off  agricultural export  demand,
lowers farm prices,  increases farm interest payments and  generates huge domestic-5-
surpluses.
The Trends Together
The trends I have  described are now about  five years  old and
have virtually nothing to  do with the  farm bill.  While interest  costs
on new debt are now moderating, most farmers continue  to hold debt  at
near historic costs.  While the dollar has  fallen  in recent months,
declining export markets  due  to an overvalued dollar and slumping prices
will persist for a time.  This  situation follows a period in  the late
1970's  in which low real  interest  rates, expanding export markets  aided
by a relatively weak dollar, and relatively strong  farm prices  made  farm
expansion seem like a reasonable thing  to do.  As  a result, many  farmers
bought land and equipment  in  the  1970's  in  the expectation that  it would
pay  for itself  through inflation and good prices - a strategy supported
and abetted by  farm lenders  in  the Farm Credit  System and commercial banks.
The result of  the  five trends  I have discussed has  been a dramatic
turnaround in land prices  (Figure 4),  particularly in  the export-dependent
cash grain sector of Minnesota.  Land prices have fallen as  real  interest
rates have risen.  The equity represented  by  this farmland now puts  the
expanding farmers  of  the  1970's  in a debt  trap  from which many will not
escape.
The Farm Bill  to  the Rescue?
In the  face of  these  trends, how much can  the new farm bill, acting
alone, hope to accomplish in  restoring U.S.  competitiveness?  More broadly,
how significant can agricultural policy, as  such, be  in resolving problems
that  arise from fiscal, monetary, and  trade policy?  I believe that  the
answer is:  "marginally significant".  I have already indicated why its-6-
impact is  is  likely to  be marginal.  First, we must  recognize  that  true
reductions in budget deficits,  not  the posturing thusfar resulting
from the Graham-Rudman-Hollings  (GRH) deficit reduction measure, will
be  required to  reduce interest  costs  and  fully relieve upward  pressure
on exchange rates.  The extremely difficult  fiscal  policy realignment
which the GRH  bill mandates,  but  does  not and  probably will not
accomplish, will mean heavy cuts  in defense and  eligible entitlement
categories, as well as  tax increases.  These tax  increases,  in David
Stockman's words, must be  "larger than we've ever had  or  contemplated."
Stockman himself  feels  that  $100  billion must  be  raised by  tax increases.
The  fact  that  agricultural support  programs  are  one  of  the  few
entitlement programs  not held harmless by  GRH is  very significant,  as  I
will argue below.
What of  significance for U.S.  competitiveness  does  the  1000-odd page
1985  Farm Bill itself  allow?  By  far the  most  important  of  its
provisions, from the perspective of  export competitiveness  and market
orientation, is  the downwardly  flexibility  loan rate  (Figures 5 and 6).
As  the figures indicate, when combined with Findley Amendment discretionary
authority by  the Secretary, the wheat loan may well fall  from $3.30  in 1985
to $2.40  in  1986,  and to  as  low as  $1.95  by  1990.  The corn loan could
fall  from $2.55  in  1985  to $1.92  in  198'6,  and  to as  low  as  $1.57  in  1990.
This is  the administration's  opportunity  to  test  the  courage  of  the
conviction that  these loans matter to exports, which will be greatest  in
the  first years of  the bill, when  target prices  are  frozen, protecting
farm income.  The administration has  moved quickly  to exercise its  authority.-7-
Why has  it moved so fast?  Because GRH is  on  its  tail.  Income
protection via frozen target prices requires significant budget
exposure in the form of deficiency  payments set by  the  two-year freeze.
With use of  discretionary authority under the Findley Amendment,  and
downward adjustments  in target prices  after two years  as  mandated
in the  bill, deficiency payments will hover  at  approximately $20,000
per  100  acres for wheat,  and approximately $23,000  per  100  acre for
corn, assuming market  prices do not  rise substantially above  to  the
loan  (Figures 5 and 6).
It  should be  noted that  this  budget  exposure is  one main reason for
the  bill's provision's  for  large  set-asides.  Wheat set-asides, triggered
by  a 1.0  billion bushel marketing year carry-in, begin without payment
at  15  percent under the program in 1986,  with an additional 2.5  percent
diversion paid in-kind and a further 7.5  percent paid  at  $2.00/bushel
optional for  those who have already planted winter wheat.  Hence,  total
setasides in  1986  could equal  25  percent  at  a maximum, and  17.5  percent
a minimum.  In  1987,  the minimum rises  to  20  percent,  the maximum to
27.5  percent, and from 1988-90,  the minimum and maximum are 20  and
30  respectively.  For  corn, a 2.0  billion bushel  carry-in triggers
a minimum 15  percent set-aside and a maximum 20  percent set-aside in
1986, with 2.5  percent paid in-kind.  After  1986,  the PIK payment is
no longer mandated, dropping the minimum to  12.5  percent while main-
taining the 20  percent maximum.  Yields are  1981-85 averages  (dis-
regarding the high and  low years) and bases are a previous five
year moving average of  planted and considered planted  acreage.-8-
These  set asides  reduce  budget exposure directly by reducing  the
acreage on which payments are made in aggregate;  they also make  the
programs  increasingly unattractive  over time,  discouraging sign-up  and
theoretically  reducing costs.  Of  course,  the lower  the sign-up, the
less  effective  the supply control provisions  of  set-asides,  and  the
less  likely market prices  are  to  rise above  the  loan, raising  the
budget exposure on those acres remaining in  the program.
Because these payments amount  to entitlements  up to  $50,000 and  have
no limit where Findley Amendment authority  is  invoked,  they are essentially
unpredictable contributions  to  the  Federal budget  deficit.  If,  as
seems likely, sign-up is  sufficiently heavy  (say 85  percent)  in  the
first  two years  of  the bill, and  the Secretary uses  his  full authority to
lower wheat  and corn loans,  then even with maximum set-asides  surpluses
will keep market  prices close  to  the loan and  budget  costs are  likely
to be very substantially above  the  levels  projected by  the Administration
and Congress.  Precisely how high above  them remains  to  be  seen.
The fact  that agricultural price supports  are  not exempt  from automatic
cuts under GRH then  becomes highly significant,  since  they become a fat
target  for slashing beyond  mandated levels,  especially if  set-asides  are
failing to  control production.  Indeed,  the  only parts  of  the agricultural
budget  immune from the March 1 GRH sequester order  are Food Stamps, WICS,
and wool and mohair.  Why wool and mohair?  Politics  is  politics.
To be most effective, however, the  courageous faith placed by  some in
lower loans as  a spur to  our competitiveness must  be  accompanied  by equal
courage in cutting budget deficits  via defense spending and  increased  taxes.-9-
Moreover, this  courage must  be  tested early  in  the game,  before  the
budget  exposure resulting from frozen  target  prices makes  agriculture
the sacrificial offering handed up  to budget  cutters.
This, as  they say,  is  the good news.  And  it  is  not  all bad  news,
by any means.  As  a spur to export  demand, it  may well work,  if  lower
loan rates are combined with a moderately  weaker dollar to  produce more
competitive prices overall.  Even so,  I for  one  am skeptical  that we
shall recover the export  position we held in  the  1970's,  and  favor the
set-asides as  a prudent short-run response to  surpluses.  However,  these
set-asides must be  flexible and  better coordinated with the  conservation
reserve which is also a part  of  the  bill.  As  for  lower loan  rates,  the
celebrated controversy  over  the price  responsiveness of  foreign demand
for  U.S. exports can now be put  to  the market  test.  Let us  hope that  it
passes that  test,  and  that  exports  do respond,  for  failure may provoke a
new round of  calls  for agricultural protectionism.
Problems with  the  1985  Farm Bill
While lowered loan rates represent  the major innovation and  hope
for  the  1985  bill,  it  is  flawed by  a number of  essentially short-run
responses  to the five  trends  sketched above  that  may actually harm
the  long-run competitiveness  of U.S.  producers.  These arise in part
from inconsistencies  in  the various  titles, which are  a natural outcome
of  the legislative process, but which now merit  administrative review
and correction.  I shall divide  these into  three categories:  (1) problems
of  coordinating commodity with conservation set-asides;  (2)  domestic and
trade  problems arising  from Payments  in Kind (PIK);  and  (3) trade subsidies
in  the  form of both BICEPS and  cargo preference.  Each deserves  brief  comment.-10-
(1)  Coordinating general with conservation  set-asides
The strict conservation language  of  the  1985  bill  represented
a major victory  for environmental interest groups and  all  those
concerned with the long-run impact  of  resource degradation on
agricultural productivity.  As  in the past, however, a major  part of
the motivation for  the passage  of  the widely  supported conservation
set-aside program, especially  given its  projected size of  40  to 45
million acres,  is supply  control.  The  agreement  puts at  least  5 million
acres into  the reserve  in  1986,  an additional  10  million in  1987,  1988
and  1989,  and a minimum of  5  million  in  1990.  The multibillion dollar
question is:  which acres?  In  the past,  the  attempt  to hit  a supply
control target with a conservation instrument has missed.  The risk of
this  program is  that  it will miss  the conservation target  as well,  by
failing to differentiate the acres  most  suitable for  the conservation
set-aside from those eligible  for general set-asides provided for
under the  commodity titles.
The  conservation plan calls for a bid  system, in which farmers
name the price  they will accept  to  retire land  (with cost sharing
for  grass or trees)  on acres  eroding at  twice  the tolerable  level
(or  "2-T").  The government will then accept  the  lowest  bids  first.
To  the farmer,  the opportunity cost of  putting highly erodible but
productive land in the program will be high, especially given the  ten-
year time  span envisioned for the  set-aside and  the  "sodbuster"
provisions of  the bill.  The acceptable bid  for this  land  from the
farmer's perspective will be  raised  by  the  foregone benefits of
participation in  the commodity program set-aside, which in a period-11-
of  low prices  is  likely to  be very attractive,  as  noted above.  This
implies that  it will be  very expensive to  draw marginal  land  into the
conservation reserve except  at high cost,  or  through the  use of  supplementary
PIK payments.  The lion's  share  of marginal acreage  is  likely to  end  up  in
set-asides under the commodity  titles, making  them competitors  for the same
acres  the conservation reserve  seeks  to  retire and raising overall costs.
The conclusion is  that  unless vulnerable  lands eligible for  the
conservation reserve are targeted  (which T-values  alone  cannot do),  and
declared ineligible for commodity program set-asides,  the  two kinds  of
set-asides will work at  cross-purposes.  Moreover, the  likelihood is  that
those  lands entering the conservation reserve without demarcation will be
highly unproductive, with the majority going into other set-asides.  The
question then becomes, what  is  being conserved?  We will have missed  the
conservation of  vulnerable soils,  failed to  reduce output  (since the  land
going  into commodity set-asides will  be  more marginal  than  if  declared
ineligible) and  spent a lot  of money in  the bargain.  We will also have
failed to shift production onto  the  land which  is  most productive  and
least erodible, which must be  our  long-term competitive strategy.
(2)  Domestic and trade problems arising  from payments-in-kind
The huge carryover stocks  of  this  year and  next  create considerable
incentives to unload government  stocks  through payments  in kind.  In  the
current bill, these payments  are designed on  the  "a little here, a
little  there" model - not  to  exceed 5 percent of  total deficiency
payments, with some  for conservation  payments,  some  for paid diversion -
and so on.  Keeping it  to  5 percent, given the budget  pressures I have-12-
mentioned, will be difficult.  The magnitude  of  surplus  stocks  spills
out  into  trade policy as well, one  reason why  the current  bill
essentially requires  $2 billion in Export-PIK payments.  There  is  a
strong likelihood of much more in  the way of PIK payments with many of
the same effects of PIK  in its  last  incarnation.  This  could be very
damaging for the farm implement  and  supply industry.  Instead,  I
would favor a much more aggressive  overseas  sales program than
provided for under the  current  bill.
(3)  Export-PIK  (BICEPS) and  Cargo Preference
A last point  concerns the Export-PIK  program itself,  and  the maritime
subsidy represented by  the  cargo-preference  rules  compromise.  Both  are
extremely ill-conceived.  In  the  case of Export-PIK, because it  fails
to do in terms  of  competitiveness what  can be  better accomplished  through
lowered loan rates and a lower dollar,  because it  invites retaliation by
the Europeans and encourages  the Soviets  to  hold  off  the market until
they benefit either from  its  depressing effects  or  the subsidy itself
(which they have demanded).
In  the case of  cargo  preference, an agreement  reached  in conference
to carry 60  percent  of U.S.  agricultural products under PL-480  on U.S.
ships in  1986,  and 75  percent by  1988,  will frustrate  general food  aid
expansion, severely  punish the  Great Lakes  ports,  and  provide a severe drag
on the competitive position of U.S.  exports  due to  the  increased costs  of
U.S. carriers.  If we want  to subsidize  the maritime  industry, there are
many cheaper ways to  do  it  (perhaps they would  like  some PIK payments).
The only possibility for  saving the  current arrangement (which still-13-
calls  for 50 percent  of food  aid  to  go on U.S.  ships)  is  if  the
Transportation Department  fails  to  come up with some  of  the  extra
shipping costs - as  they  are obliged  to - due  to  the  impact  of  GRH.
In summary, both Export-PIK and  cargo preference are  short  term
responses  to gluts,  glutted grain markets  on  the  one hand and  excess
maritime capacity on the other.  Both provisions should be  abolished,
since they undermine  our  long-term competitiveness.
Conclusion
In  conclusion, I have argued that  worldwide trends make  it
exceedingly difficult for  a farm bill,  by  itself,  to enhance our
competitiveness.  The marginal but main impact of  the current  bill will
be  felt primarily through  loan rates,  if  they are  lowered dramatically
and accompanied by  fiscal policy  realignments leading  to a lower level
of  the dollar and interest rates.  Given this  marginal impact,  there
are numerous  rough  spots in  the  1985  bill that  still need work,
notably the coordination  of  set-asides,  the reduction of PIK payments,
expansion  of foreign surplus disposal, and  the elmination of  Export-
PIK and cargo preference.  These,  and  the general cuts  imposed  by GRH,
should occupy the new Secretary early  in  his  term.Figure 1
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New  wheat  price  supports
(Examples  based  on  100  acres,  50  bushels/acre)
Without discretionary loan-rate cut
Maximum
Minimum  Total  decincy  Total  TotaL of  loan
national  loan  Target  paymnt  deftiency  &  defictiecy
loan  rate  availabl  pric  pwr  bush  payment  payment
1985........  $3.30  $16,500  $4.38  $1.08  $5,400  $21,900
1986........  $2.70  $13,500  $4.38  $1.68  $8,400  $21,900
1987  ........  $2.85  $14,250  $4.38  $1.53  $7,650  $21,900
1988........  $2.71  $13,550  $4.29  $1.58  $7,900  $21,450
1989........  $2.57  $12,850  $4.16  $1.59  $7,950  $20,800
1990........  $2.44  $12,200  $4.00  $1.56  $7,800  $20,000
With  discretionary loan-rate cut*
Maximum
Minimum  Total  dMicicy  Total  Total  o  loan
national  loan  Target  paymnt  dfiey  dicincy
lo  n  rate  available  pric  per  buetel  payment  payment
1986........  $2.40  $12,000  $4.38  $1.98.  $9,900  $21,900
1987........  $2.28  $11,400  $4.38  $2.10  $10,500  $21.900
1988........  $2.17  $10,850  $4.29  $2.12  $10,600  $21,450
1989........  $2.06  $10,300  $4.16  $2.10  $10,500  $20,800
1990 ........  $1.95  $9,750  $4.00  $2.05  $10,250  $20,000
Known *a the Findlay ammndmnt.  It allows USOA scretary to trim loan rates ae much as  20 percent to
make  U.S. grain more competitive in wortl  markets.
Both  table  assume  the  r*vOrg national  price  stays  below  the  loan  rate  and  the  maximum  dtfi-
ciany payment  * made  each  yar.Figure  6
New  corn price supports
(Examples  based  on  100 acrer,  80 bushels/acre)
Without discretionary  loan-rate cut
Maximum
Minm  Tm  To  To  dTo  Total of kon
natloal  loan  Target  payment  deficiency  &  defcelncy
lon rato  availbl  price  per busl  payment  payment
1985........  $2.55  $20,400  $3.03  $.48  $3,840  $24,240
1986........  $2.16  $17,280  $3.03  $.87  $6,960  $24,240
1987  ........  $2.28  $18,240  $3.03  $.75  $6,000  $24,240
1988  ........  $2.17  $17,360  $2.97  $.80  $6,400  $23,760
1989  .......  $2.06  $16,480  $2.88  $.82  $6,560  $23,040
1990........  $1.96  $15,680  $2.75  $.79  $6,320  $22,000
With discretionary  loan-rate cut*
Maximum
Minimum  Total  dcncy  Total  Total of loan
nutional  loan  Target  payment  defitocy  &  ddeficincy
Imn rate  avaiblb  price  pr bul  payment  payment
1986........  $1.92  $15,360  $3.03  $1.11  $8,880  $24,240
1987  ........  $1.81  $14,480  $3.03  $1.22  $9,760  $24,240
1988 ........  $1.74  $13,920  $2.97  $1.23  $9,840  $23,760
1989.......  $1.65  $13,200  $2.88  $1.23  $9,840  $23,040
1990........  $1.57  $12,560  $2.75  $1.18  $9,440  $22,000
*  Known  e th  Findly am  ndment. It  Ialows USOA  ecretary to trim loan rate  a much a  20 prcnt to
make U.S.  grain mor  compettive in world  market*.
Both table  aeuume  tli  *er  natlonra  prim stay  blow the loan  rate  and the maximum  dkeiciecy
pyment Ib  made  ach year.